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ABSTRACT 
In 1990, there were two mergers among the Big Eight 
audit firms. Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young and 
was then practising under the new name Ernst & Young. 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells merged with Touche Ross and was . 
then practising under the new name Deloitte Touche Ross. 
This study examines the ef fec t of the two mergers on 
the level of audit fees charged by the Big Eight firms. 
Specifically speaking, i t compares the audit fees charged, 
by the above four firms relat ive to other Big Eight firms 
before and a f te r the mergers. Audit fee data was extracted 
from the published accounts of 73 Hong Kong l i s t ed 
companies for the years 1988 and 1992. As hypothesized, 
audit fees charged by the four firms were found to be 
s ignif icant ly lower than that of other Big Eight firms 
before the mergers, a f ter controll ing for the size, 
complexity and riskiness of the auditees. However, th is 
"audit fee discount" was disappeared a f te r the mergers. 
The resul ts of th is study also confirm the val id i ty of the 
various determinants of audit fees found in overseas audit 
market in applying them to the case in Hong Kong. 
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During the past ten years, a number of studies have 
attempted to develop models to explain the variation in the 
level of audit fees paid by companies and to reveal any 
premium paid for the strong brand name of the auditors, 
i . e . to ident i fy any differences between fees charged by 
audit firms with strong brand name and those charged by 
other audit firms. 
Accounting researchers have typically used, a "Big 
Eight" vs "Non-Big Eight" categorization in determining 
auditors with strong brand name. The Big Eight are the 
audit firms of Authur Andersen (AA), Arthur Young (AY), 
Coopers and Lybrand (CL), Deloitte Haskins & Sells (DHS), 
Ernst & Whinney (EW), Peat Marwick (PM)f Price Waterhouse 
(PW) and Touche Ross (TR). The resul ts of these studies 
are inconclusive with some studies suggesting a "Big Eight" 
premium while others found no such premium. Simunic (19 80) 
found no price differences between Big Eight (other than 
PW) and Non-Big Eight auditors in the US market. Fir th 
(1985) also found that there was no s ignif icant "Big Eight" 
premium found for the large audit firm practising under 
their local name but a f f i l i a t e d with the international Big 
Eight firms in the New Zealand audit market. However, 
Francis (1984) , Palmrose (1986), Francis and Stokes (1986) 
2 
and Francis and Simon (1987) have suggested the existence 
of ” Big Eight" premium in both the United States and 
Australia markets. Chan et al.(1993) also found a 
signif icant "Big Eight" premium for the quoted companies in 
the UK market. 
The majority of the resul ts suggest that "Big Eight" 
premium exists to a certain extent in most of the audit 
markets. Some researchers t rea t this premium as evidence 
on monopoly pricing by large audit firms and question on 
the competitiveness of the audit industry. On the other 
hand, some researchers suggest that the price premium is 
charged by auditors for di f ferent ia ted services. other 
researchers also suggest that the price premium is charged 
because "a reputable brand name audit can be valuable for 
some cl ient companies as i t may reduce the perceived r isk 
of the firm in the eyes of investors and bankers" (Firth, 
1993). 
However, there are some other studies which suggest 
that the "Big Eight" vs "Non-Big eight" categorization may 
not be applicable in a l l cases. Beatty (1989) suggested 
that "the t radi t ional Big Eight/Non-Big Eight dis t inct ion 
might measure reputation with error since the smallest Big 
Eight and the largest Non-Big Eight appeared to exhibit 
substantial s imi la r i t i e s . " This may be par t icular ly true 
in Hong Kong where there are signif icant differences in 
firm size and market share among the Big Eight audit firms. 
The auditors for companies l i s ted in Hong Kong with 
their f inancial year ends f e l l in 1988 and 1992 
respectively were ident i f ied from the annual reports . The 
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market share of each audit firm in this population i s 
summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Market Share of Auditors in the Market of Listed Companies 
Number of clients 
1988 1992 
. Number % Number % 
Peat Marwick 45 18 46 13 
Price waterhouse 57 23 65 18 
Coopers & Lybrand 7 3 18 5 
Arthur Andersen 2 1 4 1 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 22 9 N/A N/A 
Touche Ross 1 - N/A N/A 
Deloitte Touche Ross N/A N/A 80 23 
Ernst & Whinney 22 9 N/A N/A 
Arthur Young 2 1 N/A N/A 
Ernst & Young N/A N/A 6 4 18 
Big Eight subtotal 158 64 277 78 
Kwan Wong Tan & Fong 4 3 17 57 16 
Other Non-Big Eight 48 19 23 6 
249 100 357 100 
In 1988, the audit market of l i s t ed companies in Hong 
Kong was dominated by two Big Eight firms , Peat Marwick and 
Price Waterhouse and a Non-Big Eight firm, Kwan Wong Tan & 
Fong. The aggregate market share of Peat Marwick and Price 
Waterhouse amounted to 41% of the to ta l number of l i s t ed 
companies, while the aggregate market share of the other 
six Big Eight firms amounted to 23% only. However, the 
s i tuat ion has been changed dramatically a f te r the two 
mergers among the Big Eight firms. 
In January 1990 and March 1990, Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells merged with Touche Ross and Ernst & Whinney merged 
with Arthur .Young respectively on global basis . New 
internat ional names of Deloitte Touche Ross (DTR) and Ernst 
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& Young (EY) have been used since then. Thereafter, the 
market shares of the two companies were seen to be 
increased substantially and the overall market structure of 
the audit industry in Hong Kong was also changed. As 
i l lus t ra ted in Table 1, the market share of DTR was 
increased from 9% in 1988 to 23% in 1992. The market share 
of EY was increased from 10% (being the aggregate of the 
market share of EW and AY) in 1988 to 18% in 1992. Both of 
them have become the leading audit firms in Hong Kong in 
terms of market share in l i s t ed companies. New cl ients of 
the two firms were mainly those companies newly l i s t ed in 
Hong Kong from 1991 to 1992. 
The increase in market shares of the two firms may be 
due to the improvement in thei r reputation a f te r the 
mergers. With enhancement in thei r international network, 
i t may also be possible that more business i s introduced to 
Hong Kong via the overseas of f ices . On the other hand, the 
increase in market share may also be led by charging lower 
audit fees to thei r c l ients when compared with the other 
Big Eight firms. As demonstrated by most of the previous 
studies, i t is usual for the Big Eight audit firms to 
charge a "Big Eight" premium in their audit fees when 
compared with the Non-Big Eight firms• With the pricing 
behaviour more similar to the Non-Big Eight firms, audit 
fees charged by EY and DTR will be more a t t rac t ive when 
compared with thei r Big Eight counterparts. Newly l i s t ed 
companies are more l ikely to appoint EY and DTR as auditors 
as audit services with "Big Eight quality" are provided but 
without charging any Big Eight audit fee premium. 
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In this study, I am going to study the pricing 
behaviour of EW, AY, DHS and TR before and af ter their 
respective mergers with each other. Based on the findings 
of Beatty (1989) and the above information on the market 
share of audit firms in 1988, i t is hypothesized that, 
before 1990, the four firms were more similar to the Non-
Big Eight firms in the sense that their audit fees are 
re la t ively lower than that charged by the other Big Eight 
firms. However, a f ter their mergers, their pricing 
behaviour may have been changed in a way that such an audit 
fee discount disappears and their fees become more 
comparable to that charged by the other Big Eight firms due 
to the increase in their firm size and the improvement in 
their international reputation. In other words, the 
increase in their market shares a f te r the merger i s due to 
some reasons other than offering an audit fee discount. 
The second motivation of this study i s to tes t some of 
the explanatory variables in the audit fee pricing models 
developed by previous studies which were mainly based on 
data from the United States and Australia where the 
structure of the audit market and the extent of competition 
in the audit industry are not identical to that in Hong 
Kong. As no formal study in th is area has been conducted 
in Hong Kong, i t i s interest ing to examine the val idi ty of 
these determinants in explaining the variat ion of audit 
fees in Hong Kong. Any Hong Kong related evidence provided 
by this study on these determinants of audit fees i s useful 
for future research. 
In addition to identifying the determinants of audit 
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fees in Hong Kong, i t i s also useful to investigate whether 
there were any changes in the determinants of audit fees as 
a whole a f te r the mergers of some of the Big Eight audit 
firms in 1990 by comparing the pre-merger audit fee pricing 




The t e s t examines the change in audit fee charged by 
"Big Eight"/"Big Six" auditors before and af ter the mergers 
of EW with AY and DHS with TR in 1990. Test years of 1988 
and 1992 were selected. The tes t year, 1992, was selected 
to allow suff ic ient time for a reaction in the audit 
services market to the s t ructural changes af te r the 
mergers . 
The analyses involve regressing audit fees against a 
dummy variable which equals to "1" if the auditors are EW, 
AY, DHS or TR in 1988 and EY or DTR in 1992 and "0" 
otherwise and control variables of cl ient company size, 
complexity, riskiness and peak season which were found to 
be s ignif icant explanatory variables in previous studies. 
Data for the variables were extracted - from the published 
accounts for the t es t years. The regression resul ts for 
1988 and 1992 will be compared with each other to ident i fy 
any - hypothesized changes in the audit fee premium. 
In general, size of auditees and complexity of 
auditees were found to be consistently s ignif icant in 
previous studies (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Stokes, 1986; 
Francis and Simon, 1987; Chan et a l . , 1993). As a resu l t , 
only variables of these two categories will be included in 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































i n i t i a l study to other factors will then be tested by 
incorporating the factors of audit r isks and peak, season 
into the pricing model. 
The Theoretical Framework 
A number of research studies on the determinants of 
audit fees have been carried out during the past ten years. 
The findings of these studies are summarised in Table 2. 
In general, the various explanatory variables that 
were found in previous studies can be c lass i f ied into four 
categories, namely, size of auditees, complexity of 
auditees, audit r isks and peak season. 
Size of Auditees 
Size of auditees has been found to be the most 
s ignif icant explanatory variable in determining audit fees 
in a l l of the previous research studies. The size variable 
on i t s own explained 61% and 71% of the variance in audit 
fees in the studies of Gist (1992) and Chan et a l . (1993) 
respectively. Although to ta l assets was a common measure 
of auditee size, other parameters were also used. These 
include turnover and number of audit locations. Both of 
turnover and to ta l assets are good proxies for auditee 
size. Turnover may be a bet ter measure of auditee size in 
cases where greater reliance i s placed on substantive audit 
t e s t s . With a higher turnover, the audit sample size wil l 
be increased accordingly. As a resul t , a higher time costs 
will be incurred. On the other hand, to ta l assets may be 
a bet ter measure of auditee size in cases where a balance 
sheet audit approach has been adopted. Problems that may 
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be associated with using to ta l assets as the proxy for size 
include a high correlation with other complexity variables 
such as inventory to to ta l assets ra t io and accounts 
receivables to to ta l assets ra t io . Moreover, differences 
in accounting policies in treatment of goodwill, intangible 
assets and revaluation of properties may complicate the 
s i tuat ion. 
As a resul t , turnover i s used as a proxy for auditee 
size in th is study. I t will be substituted by to ta l assets 
to check the sensi t iv i ty of the resul ts to the measure of 
size. On the other hand, the number of audit locations i s 
not used as a proxy for size because such information is 
not available in the published accounts. 
Complexity of Auditees 
Measure of complexity in previous studies include the 
degree of divers i f icat ion, accounts receivable and 
inventory to to ta l assets ra t io , number of subsidiaries and 
foreign assets to to ta l assets ra t io . 
In the studies in the US market such as Simunic 
(1980) , the degree of divers i f ica t ion was measured by using 
the number of Standard Industr ial Classif icat ion System two 
digi t industries in which the auditee operates less one. 
However, no such c lass i f i ca t ion system is being used in 
Hong Kong. As a resul t , the Herfindahl (1950) index 
adopted by Chan et al.(1993) i s used in th is study. I t i s 
calculated by the following equation : 
H =• 2 Si 
where S； refers to turnover of the i th segment as a 
11 
proportion of to ta l turnover of the auditee. 
Accounts receivable and inventory to to ta l assets 
ra t io is included in the regression model to capture the 
perceived greater costs incurred in auditing these types of 
assets. As supported by previous findings, a substantial 
portion of audit time was spent in verifying the ownership 
and valuation of inventory. Besides, i t i s also time 
consuming in checking the accuracy of movements in debtor 
balances during the year and their recoverabili ty at year 
end. 
The number of subsidiaries is also included in the 
regression model to capture the cost incurred in 
coordinating the audits in these subsidiaries, some of 
which may be audited by other local or overseas auditors. 
Moreover, i t i s also expected that additional costs will be 
incurred in preparing or auditing the consolidated accounts 
of a company having a substantial number of subsidiaries. 
In Hong Kong, i t i s a statutory requirement to l i s t out a l l 
principal subsidiaries together with their ac t i v i t i e s . I t 
is observed that some companies l i s t out a l l their 
subsidiaries including those that are dormant but some 
companies only l i s t out active subsidiaries. For the 
purpose of th is study, the def ini t ion of subsidiaries only 
takes into account of those active subsidiaries. 
、 Audit Risk 
The extent and scope of audit tes t ing are determined 
by the perceived risk of audit fa i lure . A higher audit 
r isk i s expected to resul t in a higher audit fee ei ther as 
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a consequence of more audit tes t ing or as an insurance 
premium. This hypothesis was supported by the interview 
findings in Chan et a l . (1993) . In their study, a l l the 
audit firm partners interviewed agreed that audit r isk was 
a significant factor in determining the extent of necessary 
audit work and in consequence the amount of fee charged. 
However, i t is d i f f i cu l t to measure audit r isk 
directly from the financial statements. Previous studies 
have used continuous 3-year loss indicator, l iquidi ty 
rat io, long term debt to equity ra t io and the type of audit 
opinion as proxies for audit r isk . However, the resul ts 
are inconclusive. None of these explanatory variables are 
found to be consistently s igni f icant . 
Gist (1992) suggested that the uncertainty associated 
with the "subject to" opinions resul ts in greater r isk and 
additional audit procedures for auditors. However, in Hong 
Kong, there are not too many cases where a qualif ied audit 
report i s issued on the published accounts of a l i s t ed 
company. For examplef among the published accounts for the 
companies in my 1992 sample, there was only one qual i f ied 
audit report. As a resul t , i t i s not feasible to include 
the "subject to" qualif ied opinion dummy variable in the 
pricing model to capture the extent of audit r isks. 
Instead, in th is study, a long term debt to equity 
ra t io i s used to measure the f inancial riskiness of the 
c l ien t . I t has been used in previous research to proxy for 
the auditors ' loss exposure or audit r isk (Francis, 1984). 
Similar to the 3-year loss indicator, va r i ab i l i ty in 
prof i t between the tes t year and i t s preceding year i s also 
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incorporated into the model. This variable is expected to 
control for riskiness associated with great fluctuations in 
reported p rof i t s . This variable i s considered to be better 
than the 3-year loss indicator as i t captures the magnitude 
of the fluctuation in p rof i t s . 
Peak Season 
The "peak season" factor has been taken into account 
by Francis (1984) and Francis and Stokes (1986). The 
factor was found to be insignif icant in both studies. In 
Hong Kong, most of the l i s t ed companies have a financial 
year end at ei ther 31 December or 31 March. A dummy 
variable in which a financial year end between 31 December 
and 28 February represents the peak season (value = 1) and 
otherwise as the non-peak season (value = 0) is 
incorporateci into the model to determine whether audit 
firms attempt to smooth out these peaks by charging premium 
prices for peak season c l ien ts . 
Dependent Variable 
Under the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, audit fees 
are required to be disclosed in the published accounts. 
This disclosed figure i s used as the dependent variable. 
The disclosed audit fee is normally the sum of the 
estimated audit fee for the current year and the adjustment 
for the over- or under-provision of the fee for previous 
years. I t is assumed that any material adjustment for 
over- or under-provision in respect of prior years will be 
disclosed separately in order to present a true and fa i r 
view of the af f a i r s of the company in the accounts. If 
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there i s no separate disclosure, the whole disclosed fee i s 
considered to be solely for the current year 's service. 
The disclosed fee is considered as the best indicator for 
audit fee in my study as i t is solely related to audit 
services. 
Sample Selection 
The to ta l number of companies l i s t ed in Hong Kong in 
January 1988 was 27 8. Details of these companies are 
available in Securities Journal (February 1988), an 
o f f i c i a l publication of Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Out 
of these 278 companies, 171 were s t i l l l i s t ed in December 
1992 without changing their names and l i s t i ng codes, 
indicating that there was no material changes in their 
major shareholders and business ac t i v i t i e s . This sample 
was further reduced by the following res t r i c t ions and was 
summarised in Table 3. 
F i rs t ly , companies having a financial period of more 
or less than 12 months in ei ther 1988 or 1992 were excluded 
to eliminate the ef fec t of the length of the reporting 
period on audit fees charged. 
Secondly, companies having more than one auditor in 
ei ther 1988 or 1992 were excluded, as the pricing model in 
the case of joint audit may be di f ferent from the one used 
in th is study. 
Thirdly, the sample i s res t r ic ted to companies that 
did not change auditors during the period from 1988 to 1992 
in order to make the two sets of samples more comparable 
with each other. Further, auditor change e f fec t such as 
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"low-balling" pricing strategies (Francis and Simon, 1987) 
was eliminated. 
Fourthly, banks and insurance companies were excluded 
for two reasons. Disclosure requirements in the financial 
statements of banks and insurance companies are di f ferent 
from other industries. Di f f icu l t ies may be encountered in 
collecting certain information such as turnover figure. 
Further, previous research (Simunic, 1980) has shown a 
s ignif icant industry ef fec t for banking. This implies that 
the audit fee function is d i f ferent in banks than in other 
companies. 
Fif thly, a l l companies which were audited by "Non-Big 
Eight" auditors were excluded. 
Finally, out of the remaining 80 companies, 3 were 
audited by overseas auditors and 4 have not disclosed their 
turnover figures in their annual reports in ei ther 1988 or 
1992. These companies were excluded to arrive at the f inal 
sample of 73 companies. The dis t r ibut ion of each Big Eight 
auditors in the sample i s shown in Table 4. 
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Table 10 
Summary of Sample Selection Procedure 
Number 
I n i t i a l sample of companies l i s t ed 
in both 1988 and 1992 171 
Companies with financial period not 
equals to 12 months (10) 
Joint audits (13) 
Change of auditors during the period (29) 
Bank and insurance companies (8) 
111 
"Non-Big Eight" auditors (31) 
80 
Overseas auditors (3) 
Companies with no turnover figure disclosed (4) 
Final sample 7 3 
Table 4 
Distribution of Auditors in the Final Sample 
Number of 
Auditor Companies % 
PM 25 34 
PW 24 33 
CL 2 3 
AA -
DHS/DTR 11 15 
EW/AY/EY 11 • 15 
73 100 
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CHAPTER II I 
FINDINGS 
Preliminarv Results 
In th is section, the preliminary resul ts in the form 
of descriptive s t a t i s t i c s and correlation among variables 
used in th is study are reported. 
The descriptive s t a t i s t i c s of a l l continuous variables 
are tabulated in Table 9 in Appendix 1. As the size 
variable i s expected to be the most s ignif icant variable in 
explaining the variance of audit fee, in order to prevent 
the large size companies from dominating the overall 
resul ts , companies having a to ta l assets value of more than 
HK$10 b i l l ion were eliminated from the original sample. As 
a result , eight companies were eliminated from the 1988 
sample and the sample size was reduced to 65. Twelve 
companies were eliminated from the 1992 sample and the 
sample size was reduced to 61. None, of the companies 
eliminated were audited by DHS/DTR or EW/AY/EY. After the 
elimination, the mean to ta l assets and turnover for the 
1988 samples were decreased to HK$1,474 million and HK$708 
million respectively. The mean to ta l assets and turnover 
for the 1992 sample were decreased to HK$2,463 million and 
HK$1,233 million respectively. The descriptive s t a t i s t i c s 
of the continuous variables a f te r the elimination of 
exceptionally large auditees are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 10 
Mean and Standard Deviation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
-Samples After Elimination of Exceptionally Large Auditees 
(a) 1988 Sample (n = 65) 
Full Merged Other 
Variables Sample Firms Firms 
Audit Fee 636 386 764 
(607) (228) (696) 
Total Assets 1,474,283 1,078,207 1,676,926 
(1,838,290) (1,588,459) (1,940,003) 
Turnover 707,501 478,254 824,791 
(727,944) (551,323) (783,505) 
Number of Subsidiaries 14.785 15.227 14.558 
(21.610) (16.154) (24.103) 
Diversification index 0.713 0.690 0.725 
(0.252) (0.271) (0.244) 
% of Receivables 
and Inventories to 22.644 23.945 21.978 
Total Assets (24.691) (26.894) (23.791) 
% Change in Prof i ts 72.395 91.480 62.631 
(154.126) (162.759) (150.546) 
% of Long Term Debts 16.452 14.119 17.645 
to Equity (40.022) (13.969) (48.362) 
(b) 1992 Sample (n = 61) 
Full Merged Other 
Variables Sample Firms Firms 
Audit Fee 1,464 1,851 1,245 
(1,777) (2,521) (1,158) 
Total Assets 2,462, 805 2, 699,944 2, 329,034 
(2,398,861) (3,060,487) (1,964,413) 
Turnover 1,232,788 1,317,512 1,184,994 
(1,488,275) (2,101,807) (1,102,455) 
Number of Subsidiaries 18.541 24.182 15.359 
(18.273) (22.570) (14.726) 
Diversification index 0.705 0.645 0.739 
(0.276) (0.299) (0.259) 
% of Receivables ‘ 
and Inventories to 19.990 21.378 19.206 
Total Assets (21.474) (23.400) (20.586) 
% Chang© in Prof i ts 73.781 190.182 8.118 
(276.102) (423.496) (94.784) 
% of Long Term Debts 18.177 17.076 15.359 
to Equity (39.205) (17.105) (14.726) 
1. Audit Fee, Total Assets and Turnover are expressed in HK$'000. 
2. Standard deviations of the variables are shown in parentheses. 
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Consistent with previous studies, natural log 
transformation was carried out on the audit fee and the 
size variables i . e . to ta l assets and turnover. Square root 
transformation was carried out on the number of 
subsidiaries. Pearson product moment correlation 
coeff ic ients were calculated for the variables af ter 
carrying out the above transformations and the elimination 
of the large size companies. The coeff ic ients for the 
transformed variables are shown in Table 6. 
Similar to previous studies, i t can be seen from the 
correlat ion matrix that several variables are highly 
correlated with audit fee. Moreover, s ignif icant 
correlations between ARINV and DIVER, between SUB and DIVER 
and between LTDEBT and ARINV exis t . 
Table 6 - Pearson Correlation Matrix 
1988 Sample (n = 65) 
FEE ASSETS TURNOVER ARINV SUB DIVER PROFIT LTDEBT SEASON AUDITOR 
FEE 1.000 
ASSETS 0.488 1.000 
(0.000) 
TURNOVER 0.701 0.587 1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ARINV 0.124 -0.333 0.005 1.000 
(0.326) (0.007) (0.971) 
SUB 0.573 0.518 0.269 -0.100 1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.430) 
DIVER -0.120 -0.111 0.119 0.273 -0.291 1.000 
(0.342) (0.379) (0.344) (0.028) (0.019) 
PROFIT 0.168 -0.135 0.015 0.202 0.091 -0.008 1.000 
(0.182) (0.284) (0.908) (0.107) (0.471) (0.949) 
LTDEBT -0.143 0.105 -0.068 0.285 -0.100 -0.061 -0.061 1.000 
(0.257) (0.406) (0.593) (0.021) (0.430) (0.631) (0.631) 
SEASON 0.022 0.119 0.073 0.034 -0.073 -0.036 -0.036 0.210 1.000 
(0.859) (0.345) (0.561) (0.787) (0.563) (0.777) (0.777) (0.093) 
AUDITOR -0.323 -0.312 -0.339 0.038 0.104 0.089 0.089 -0.042 0.103 1.000 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.764) (0.410) (0.480) (0.480) (0.740) (0.415) 
1992 Sample (n = 61) 
FEE ASSETS TURNOVER ARINV SUB DIVER PROFIT LTDEBT SEASON AUDITOR 
FEE 1.000 
ASSETS 0.608 1.000 
(0.000) 
TURNOVER 0.565 0.687 1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ARINV 0.216 -0.190 0.148 1.000 
(0.095) (0.142) (0.156) 
SUB 0.715 0.484 0.408 0.063 1.000 . 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.628) 
DIVER -0.216 -0.102 0.263 0.234 -0.331 1.000 
(0.094) (0.436) (0.041) (0.069) (0.009) 
PROFIT -0.033 -0.025 0.030 0.086 0.062 0.000 1.000 
(0.802) (0.849) (0.820) (0.511) (0.637) (0.998) 
LTDEBT -0.174 0.051 -0.054 0.389 -0.150 0.130 -0.066 1.000 
(0.181) (0.697) (0.678) (0.002) (0.250) (0.320) (0.614) 
SEASON 0.144 0.279 0.155 -0.019 0.090 -0.166 -0.136 0.141 1.000 
(0.268) (0.029) (0.232) (0.885) (0.491) (0.200) (0.294) (0.277) 
AUDITOR 0.055 -0.107 -0.206 0.049 0.237 -0.166 0.319 -0.021 0.149 1.000 
JO.672) (0.410) (0.111) (0.708) (0.066) (0.201) (0.012) (0.871) (0.252) 
P-Values are shown in parentheses 
FEE = Ln (External Audit Fee) DIVER = Diversification Index 
ASSETS = Ln (Total Assets) PROFIT = % Change in Profit 
TURNOVER = Ln (Turnover) LTDEBT = Long Term Debt to Equity Ratio 
ARINV = % of Accounts Receivable and SEASON = Peak Season Indicator 
Inventories to Total Assets AUDITOR = Indicator fo「 EW, AY o「 
SUB = Square root (Number of DHS in 1988 and for EY or DTR 
Subsidiaries) i n 1992 
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Multivariate Analysis 
Based on my previous discussion, the estimated model 
used for the analysis is : 
FEE = b0 + bjTURNOVER + b^RINV + b3SUBS + b4DIVER + 
b5AUDITOR + u 
where FEE = Ln (External Audit Fee) 
TURNOVER = Ln (Turnover) 
ARINV = % of accounts receivable and 
inventories to to ta l assets 
SUBS = square root of to ta l number 
of active subsidiaries 
DIVER = Herfindahl Index 
AUDITOR = "1” if the auditor i s EW, AY 
or DHS in 1988 and EY or DTR 
in 1992. "0" otherwise. 
The regression equations were estimated for the 1988 
and 1992 samples respectively. Table 7 shows the resul ts 
of the regression analysis. 
The resul ts indicate that the signs'of a l l explanatory 
variables are in accordance with the hypothesized 
relat ionship discussed in the l as t section. All 
independent variables are found to be s ignif icant in 
explaining the variations in audit fee in both samples. As 
hypothesized, a s ignif icant negative audit fee premium was 
found for the companies audited by DHS, EW and AY in 1988. 
However, the magnitude of th is negative audit fee premium 
diminished and became ins ignif icant in 1992. Adjusted R
2
s, 
which measure the explanatory power of the model used in 
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this study are 0.704 and 0.609 in 1988 and 1992 
respectively. This indicates that the explanatory power of 
the model i s re la t ively high and is comparable with those 
in previous studies, which ranged from 0.70 to 0.89. 
A number of tes t s on the regression residuals were 
performed to check the extent to which the assumptions 
underlying ordinary least squares multivariate analysis 
were violated. Histograms of the residuals were 
constructed and examined. The resul ts showed that the 
distr ibution of the residuals did not seriously depart from 
the assumption of normality. In addition, the null 
hypothesis that the residuals are normally distr ibuted 
cannot be rejected at a = .05 for both samples using a chi-
square t e s t . A tes t of the independence of the residuals 
and the explanatory variables was conducted by plot t ing 
residuals against the continuous individual explanatory 
variables. No systematic pattern was observed. 
A tes t was also performed to ensure that the above 
results were not driven by any one of the two audit firms. 
Separate independent variables were used for each of the 
two audit firms in the regression equation. For th is 
second regression, the coeff ic ients were negative for both 
firms and were s ignif icant at the .05 level in the 1988 
samples. For the 1992 sample, the coeff ic ient was positive 
for DTR and negative for EY, none was found to be 
s ignif icant . The signs and the significance of the 
coeff ic ients of other explanatory variables were very 
similar to that reported in Table 7. 
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Table 10 
Results of the Multiple Regression - Using Samples After Elimination of 
Exceptionally Large Auditees 
Dependent Variable : Ln Audit Fee 
Independent Hypothesized Coefficients 
Variables Sign 1988 1992 
Intercept 1.823 * 4.298 * 
(0.003) (0.000) 
TURNOVER + 0.314 * 0.160 * 
(0.000) (0.001) 
ARINV + 0. 007 * 0. 007 ** 
(0.005) (0.061) 
SUBS + 0.164 * 0.203 * 
(0.000) (0.000) 
DIVER - -0.409 ** -0.627 ** 
(0.100) (0.052) 




 0.704 0.609 
Sample Size 65 61 
1. * signif icant at .05 level in a two-tail t - t e s t 
** signif icant at .10 level in a two-tail t - t e s t 
2. P-values of the regression coeff ic ients are shown in parentheses. 
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Sensit ivity Analysis 
A number of t es t s were performed to check the 
sens i t iv i ty of the resul ts to 
a) the elimination of large size auditees 
b) the measure of size 
c) the introduction of additional explanatory variables. 
The same regression equations were estimated for the 
original samples ( i .e . 73 companies without elimination of 
auditees with to ta l assets value greater than HK$10 
million) . The results were shown in Appendix 2. The level 
of significance and signs of the variables were very 
similar to the previous analysis. A negative audit fee 
premium which was s ignif icant at .05 level was found in 
1988 but not in 1992. As expected, the explanatory power 
of the model for the original samples was higher than the 
previous analysis with the exceptionally large auditees 
being eliminated. Adjusted R
2
s were found to be 0.804 and 
0.696 in 1988 and 1992 respectively. 
As auditee size i s a s ignif icant determinant of audit 
fee, i t i s important to ensure that the resul ts are not 
sensitive to the proxy for auditee size used in the model. 
As a resu l t , the regression model was re-estimated by 
replacing the natural log of turnover with natural log of 
to ta l assets as the measure of size to t es t the sens i t iv i ty 
of the resul ts to this change. Same resul ts were obtained 
in respect of the sign and significance of the AUDITOR 
variable. However, DIVER was found to be not s ignif icant 
in both the 1988 and 1992 samples. Adjusted R
2
 was found to 
be 0.499 (compared with 0.704) in 1988 and 0.644 (compared 
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with 0.609) in 1992. 
Additional independent variables which include 
var iab i l i ty in operating prof i t , ra t io of long term debt to 
equity and peak season indicators were incorporated into 
the regression model to tes t the sensi t iv i ty of the resul ts 
to the introduction of the new independent variables. 
Moreover, the val idi ty of certain determinants of audit 
fees ident i f ied by previous studies in overseas markets (as 
summarised in Table 2) can also be tested in the Hong Kong 
context. 
Results of the regression analysis were summarised in 
Table 8. I t can be seen that , by introducing additional 
independent variables, the explanatory power of the audit 
pricing model has been improved s l ight ly . Adjusted R
2
 has 
been increased from 0.704 to 0.720 in 1988 and from 0.609 
to 0.619 in 1992, The signs of the coeff ic ient of AUDITOR 
are consistent with the resul ts of my previous analysis. 
A negative audit fee premium was found for EW, AY and DHS 
before the mergers. The signs and the significance of 
other independent variables were also (Consistent with my 
previous findings. For the additional independent 
variables, i . e . PROFIT, LTDEBT and SEASON, only LTDEBT was 
found to be s ignif icant . However, the sign of the 
coeff ic ient of LTDEBT was not as that hypothesized. 
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Table 10 
Results of the Multiple Regression With Additional Independent 
Variables - Using Samples After Elimination of Exceptionally Large 
Auditees 
Dependent Variable : Ln Audit Fee 
Independent Hypothesized Coefficients 
Variables Sign 1988 1992 
Intercept 1.986 * 4.362 * 
(0.001) (0.000) 
TURNOVER + 0.299 * 0.157 * 
(0.000) (0.002) 
ARINV + 0.007 * 0.010 * 
(0.003) (0.014) 
SUBS + 0.162 * 0.193 * 
(0.000) (0.000) 
DIVER - -0.400 ** -0.606 ** 
(0.098) (0.067) 
PROFIT + 0.000 -0.000 
(0.198) (0.253) 
LTDEBT + -0.003 ** -0.004 ** 
(0.056) (0.082) 
SEASON + 0.120 0.044 
(0.302) (0.776) 




 0.720 0.619 
Sample Size 65 61 
1. * s ignif icant at .05 level in a two-tail t - t e s t 
** signif icant at .10 level in a two-tail t - t e s t 
2. P-values of the regression coeff ic ients are shown in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Traditional studies on the variations in the level of 
audit fees have concentrated on investigating whether there 
are differences between the audit fees charged by Big Eight 
firms and Non-Big Eight firms. The majority of these 
studies found the presence of a Big Eight premium. Such 
findings were consistent across different countries. While 
there are well established evidence of the presence of a 
Big Eight premium, not much has been addressed at the 
possible differences in the level of audit fees charged 
among the Big Eight firms. Such evidence was provided by 
the findings of Simunic (1980) where Price Waterhouse was 
found to be charging higher audit fees than the other Big 
Eight firms. Further, Beatty (1989) has used a largest 
five, middle six and smallest nine c lass i f i ca t ion in his 
study of the relationship between auditor reputation and 
the pricing of i n i t i a l public offerings. I t was concluded 
in his study that such c lass i f i ca t ion was found to be more 
accurate and the va l id i ty of the t radi t ional Big Eight/Non-
Big Eight c lass i f ica t ion was questioned. 
The resul ts of th is study offer useful information 
regarding the variations in the level of audit fees charged 
by the Big Eight audit firms in Hong Kong. Given the 
uneven dis t r ibut ion of market share among the Big Eight 
firms (Table 1), i t was found that the audit fees charged 
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by Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Whinney and Arthur 
Young were s ignif icant ly lower than the other Big Eight 
firms (which was mainly comprised of Peat Marwick and Price 
Waterhouse in our samples) in 1988, i . e . before the 
mergers. According to Simunic (1980) , "different iated 
products are not observed direct ly but rather are revealed 
by differences in prices which are associated with 
differences in observed product character is t ics ." The 
evidence of price differences provided by this study 
supports the existence of product d i f ferent ia t ion across 
the Big Eight firms in Hong Kong during the period before 
the mergers of certain Big Eight firms to form the Big Six 
firms. For audit services, the only thing that can be 
d i f ferent ia ted by c l ients i s the reputation of the audit 
firm. This implies that the perceived reputation of the 
three firms was not as high as the other Big Eight firms. 
However, the price d i f fe ren t ia t ion among the Big Eight 
firms observed in 1988 was disappeared in 1992, i . e . a f t e r 
the mergers. Together with the substantial increase in the 
market share of Ernst & Young and Deloitte Touche Ross, 
this may imply that their perceived reputation to the 
public was improved af ter the mergers and are now more 
similar to the other Big Eight firms. I t also provides 
evidence that i t i s unlikely that the increase in market 
share was brought along by price cutt ing. Reasons for such 
observations have to be found out by future research. 
I t can be seen from the descriptive s t a t i s t i c s in 
Table 5 that the average size of the auditees of EW, DRS 
and AY was much lower than that of the auditees of the 
29 
other Big Eight firms in 1988. The hypothesis that there 
was no difference between the mean values of the turnover 
of the two 1988 sub-samples was rejected at .05 
significance level . However, similar hypothesis on the 
mean values of the to ta l assets cannot be rejected. No 
such size difference was found in the 1992 sample. At 
f i r s t glance, the emergence of the negative audit fee 
premium may be related to the difference in auditee size. 
Once the size difference was disappeared, the negative 
premium was also diminished. However, th is argument i s 
questionable. F i rs t ly , there was no signif icant difference 
in auditee size in terms of to ta l assets . However, the 
negative premium was s t i l l observed in the regression model 
using natural log of to ta l assets as the size variable. 
Secondly, the argument implies that an audit fee premium 
was paid by large auditees. This contradicts with the 
findings of Simunic (1980). In his study, a negative "Big 
Eight" premium was observed for large auditees because of 
the economies of scale enjoyed by the large audit firms. 
With regard to the other explanatory variables, the 
findings are consistent with previous studies. Auditee 
size, whether proxied by natural log of the turnover or 
to ta l assets, was found to be a s ignif icant variable in 
explaining the variat ion in audit fees. The size variable 
(natural log of turnover) on i t s own explained 48 per cent 
of variation in audit fees in the 1988 sample. 
Both the accounts receivable and inventories to to t a l 
assets ra t io and number of subsidiaries which proxy for the 
complexity of the auditees were found to be s ignif icant in 
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the pricing model for both of the 1988 and 1992 samples. 
The signif icant association between the accounts receivable 
and inventories ra t io and audit fee contradicted with the 
findings in Chan et a l . (1993) . In Chan et a l . (1993) , i t 
was unable to detect such signif icant association when 
turnover was being used as a proxy for auditee size. As 
pointed out in their study, "the inabi l i ty to detect a 
uniform s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ignif icant association between 
receivables and inventories rat ios i s puzzling The 
emergence of such an association only when the auditee size 
was proxied by to ta l assets remained unexplained." The 
resul ts of my study indicate that a s ignif icant ly positive 
association between the receivables and inventories to 
to ta l assets ra t io and the level of audit fees was found 
even in the case that the auditee size was proxied by 
turnover. Such association was as hypothesized. 
The significance of the degree of d ivers i f ica t ion 
proxied by the Herfindahl index in the audit fee pricing 
model provides further evidence of the importance of using 
th is index to proxy for the degree of d ivers i f ica t ion of 
the auditees. The index was f i r s t l y used by Chan et 
al.(1993) who concluded that the index was "a more refined 
measure of d ivers i f ica t ion than that employed by Simunic 
(1980)" and suggested that "this i s a variable worthy of 
use in future research." 
Except the long term debt to equity ra t io , none of the 
variables which proxy for the riskiness of the auditees was 
found to be s ignif icant in the audit fee pricing model. 
Although the long term debt to equity ra t io was found to be 
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signif icant at .10 level, i t s sign was not as that 
hypothesized. This is not surprising as inconsistent 
resul ts were also found in previous studies (Table 2) . The 
significance of variables such as long term debt to equity 
ra t io and fluctuation in operating prof i t s in explaining 
the variation in audit fees were inconclusive in previous 
studies. This indicates the d i f f i cu l t i e s in finding 
variables to proxy for the riskiness of the auditees 
perceived by the auditors. 
Generally speaking, the models used in our studies 
offer a sat isfactory explanatory power and are in l ine with 
previous studies. The adjusted R
2
s were 0.704 and 0.609 in 
1988 and 1992 respectively. The decrease in the 
explanatory power of the model in the 1992 sample may 
indicate the emergence of some new variables which may or 
may not be related to the mergers in 1990. Such new 
variables may also account for the diniinishing of the 
negative audit fee premium in 1992. Future research in 
th is area i s suggested. 
The resul ts of this study are subject to certain 
l imitat ions. They should be borne in mind when 
interpret ing the resul ts . The samples used in th i s study 
were res t r i c ted to those companies which were audited by 
one of the Big Eight firms and l i s t ed in both 1988 and 
1992. The sample size of the study was only 65 and 61 
companies in 1988 and 1992 respectively, in which there 
were only 22 companies being audited by EW, DHS and AY. In 
order to obtain more s ignif icant s t a t i s t i c a l evidence, the 
sample size should be expanded accordingly by including 
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data of more than one year before and af ter the mergers. 
By having a expanded sample size, i t i s also feasible to 
perform more detailed analysis such as testing the 
sensi t iv i ty of the resul ts across sub-samples of dif ferent 
auditee sizes. 
The high correlation between certain independent 
variables also limits the val idi ty of the resul ts . For 
example, DIVER was found to be highly correlated with both 
ARINV and SUBS in both samples. This may result in 
misinterpretation of the sign and significance of each 
independent variables in the regression model. 
Only variables that are readily available in the 
published accounts were incorporated into the model. I t is 
obvious that some useful variables such as the number of 
audit locations and the extensiveness of internal audit 
function were omitted. I t i s believed that the relevance 
of the number of audit locations in determining the level 
of audit fees i s becoming more and more important in recent 
years due to the global expansion of local companies. 
Moreover, most of the manufacturing companies have 
relocated their main operations to Mainland China. This 
will incur additional audit time costs in areas such as 
stocktaking and inspection of plant and machinery. 
However, limited information in th is respect i s disclosed 
in the published accounts. 
The resul ts only indicate that the audit fees charged 
by EW, DHS and AY were lower than the other Big Eight firms 
before the mergers. I t has not indicated whether the fees 
charged by the three firms were comparable with the Non-Big 
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Eight firms or a "Big Eight" premium was s t i l l observed in 
the fees charged by the three firms when compared, with the 
Non-Big Eight firms. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of th is study is to investigate 
whether there i s any differences in pricing behaviour 
across the Big Eight firms before and af ter the two mergers 
among the Big Eight firms in 1990. The firms used for my 
study were Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Touche Ross, Ernst & 
Whinney and Arthur Young. In 1990, Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells merged with Touche Ross and was then practising under 
the new name Deloitte Touche Ross. In the same year, Ernst 
& Whinney also merged with Arthur Young and was then 
practising under the new name Ernst & Young. In th is 
study, i t was revealed that before the respective mergers, 
audit fees charged by the three firms (no companies in my 
samples was audited by Touche Ross) were s ignif icant ly 
lower than their Big Eight counterparts. This finding 
supports the argument of Beatty (1989) In his study of 
the relat ionship between auditor reputation and the pricing 
of the i n i t i a l public offerings, the resul ts indicated that 
11
 the widely used Big Eight/Non-Big Eight c lass i f ica t ion may 
measure CPA firm reputation capi ta l with error par t icular ly 
for the smaller Big Eight and the larger non-Big Eight 
firms." However, the magnitude of such audit fee 
"discount" diminished and was insignif icant a f te r the 
mergers. This finding is useful to researchers as they 
have to be careful about using the t rad i t iona l 
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class i f ica t ion of Big Eight/Non-Big Eight to proxy for the 
reputation of audit firms in studies of audit fees in Hong 
Kong. For any periods before the mergers, i . e . 1990, the 
c lass i f ica t ion may not be valid in Hong Kong. On the other 
hand, the c lass i f ica t ion may be applicable in any periods 
af ter the mergers. 
The resul ts of this study also indicate that variables 
which were found to be significant in explaining the 
variation in audit fees in other countries such as the 
United States and Australia are also applicable in the case 
of Hong Kong. Size variables in terms of both turnover and 
to ta l assets, degree of divers i f icat ion, number of 
subsidiaries and % of accounts receivable and inventories 
to to ta l assets were a l l found to be s ignif icant 
determinants of audit fees in Hong Kong before and a f te r 




Descriptive S ta t i s t i c s - Samples Before Elimination of Exceptionally 
Large Auditees 
(a) 1988 Sample (n = 73) 
Standard 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation 
Audit Fee 90 10,600 987 1,633 
Total Assets 34 48,642 3,834 8,175 
Turnover 8 25,141 1,633 3,741 
Number of Subsidiaries 0 147 17.78 25.97 
Diversification Index 0.26 1.00 0.70 0.25 
% of Receivables and 
Inventories to Total 
Assets 0.14 99.99 20.88 23.86 
% Change in Prof i ts -126.01 894.11 67.01 146.27 
% of Long Term 
Debts to Equity 0.00 304.72 19.00 42.13 
(b) 1992 Sample (n = 73) 
Standard. 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation 
Audit Fee 165 15,600 2,017 2,842 
Total Assets 19 96,014 7,880 16,020 
Turnover 0 38,920 2,692 5,855 
Number of Subsidiaries 0 181 24.21 29.24 
Diversif ication Index 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.28 
% of Receivables and 
Inventories to Total 
Assets 0.00 98.51 17.36 20.53 
% Change in Prof i ts -464.44 1,646.10 66.20 252.94 
% of Long Term 
Debts to Equity 0.00 284.06 20.11 39.03 
1. Audit Fee is expressed in HK$'000. Total Assets and Turnover are 




Results of the Multiple Regression - Using Samples Before Elimination 
of Exceptionally Large Auditees 
Dependent Variable : Ln Audit Fee 
Independent Hypothesized Coefficients 
Variables Sign 1988 1992 
Intercept 1.362 * 4.016 * 
(0.010) (0.000) 
TURNOVER + 0.355 * 0.199 * 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ARINV + 0. 006 * 0 . 005 ** 
(0.008) (0.100) 
SUBS + 0.172 * 0.194 * 
(0.000) (0.000) 
DIVER - -0.472 * -0.807 * 
(0.045) (0.004) 




 0.804 0.696 
Sample size 7 3 13 
1. * s ignif icant at .05 level in a two-tail t - t e s t 
** signif icant at .10 level in a two-tail t - t e s t 
2. P-values of the regression coeff ic ients are shown in parentheses. 
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